We analyze committees of voters who take a decision between two options as a twostage process. In a discussion stage, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes are cast and one of the options is implemented. We introduce the possibility of leadership whereby a certain voter, the leader, is more influential than the rest at the discussion stage even though she is not better informed. We study information transmission and characterize the effects of the leader on the deliberation process. We find, amongst others, that both the quality of the decision taken by the committee and how truthful voters are at the discussion stage depends non-monotonically on how influential the leader is. In particular, although a leader whose influence is weak does not disrupt the decision process of the committee in any way, a very influential leader is less disruptive than a moderately influential leader.
Introduction
Committees are a common framework for making choices. In a committee, its members discuss their views on the issue at stake and then choose among the different options, usually via voting. For example, a company's chief executives meet often to decide the firm's future strategy. Ministers of a cabinet meet regularly to choose the policies the government should follow. Faculty members in a university meet during staff meetings to agree on new appointments, course programs, etc.
A frequent feature of committees is that the opinions of some of its members, leaders, are taken as more relevant by some its other members. This can happen even though leaders may not necessarily be better informed about the issue at hand than other committee members.
The leaders' opinions can be persuasive to other committee members for a variety of reasons.
It may be that leaders are more effective at communicating their views or that some committee members believe the leaders to be better informed. Alternatively, some committee members may want to favor the leaders' views expecting something in return.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the implications of leadership on information aggregation and choices in deliberative committees. We try to answer this question by understating how the existence of a leader affects the incentives of other committee members to manipulate information, possibly to counter the influence of the leader. Furthermore, we are also interested in understating if it is possible to mitigate the potential negative effects of a leader.
To this end, we consider a common value election setting where committee members, voters, have to decide between two options: whether to change to a certain alternative or to maintain the status quo. Voters receive a piece of private information (signal) about which option is best for the committee. Voters then meet at a discussion stage and talk about the two options. During the discussion stage voters express their support for either of the options by simultaneously reporting, truthfully or not, the value of their private signals. Afterwards, during a voting stage, each voter simultaneously casts a ballot for one of the options and the alternative beats the status quo if and only if it receives at least a given number of votes.
Within the committee, there are three types of voters. First, there is the leader, who is characterized by her influence on other voters. The leader's influence on other voters manifests via the second type of voters: the followers. Followers regard the leader's views as the truth and, thus, vote for the option that is supported by the leader during the discussion stage. The final type of voters is the objective voters, who want to implement the best option.
Thus, followers are committee members that distort the social decision process where all other voters have an interest in implementing the best option.
In our results, we find that a situation where all voters are truthful at the discussion stage is possible if and only if there are either too few or sufficiently many followers. Too few followers means that followers are not enough as to influence the decision process of the committee in any meaningful way, because they are greatly outnumbered by objective voters.
On the other hand, if there are many followers then the leader's opinion at the discussion stage is the only opinion that matters. Since the leader's only piece of information regarding what is the best option is in this case his own signal then he has incentives to truthfully report it to the committee.
When a non-majority rule is in place (more than half the votes needed for abandoning the status quo in favour of the alternative), there are situations where all voters truthfully reporting their signals cannot be an equilibrium. This happens whenever there are more than few but not too many followers: followers are enough to block the implementation of the alternative but not enough to entirely decide the outcome of the election. This is the case as if a follower's message at the discussion stage has any effect in the outcome of the election, it must be because the leader is going to support the alternative as otherwise all followers vote for the status quo and the implementation of the alternative is blocked. Thus, whenever the message revealed by a follower matters, it must be that the leader is going to support the alternative and, hence, such follower has incentives to also support the alternative regardless on her own signal, i.e. she has incentives to lie.
Our results characterize how the existence of a leader and her followers affect information revelation in committees. Surprisingly, it is not true that more followers make truthful sharing of information more unlikely. Moreover, we also find that ceteris paribus the majority rule is the best voting rule in that it makes truthful sharing of information more likely. Thus, a way to mitigate the effects of the followers in decision making in committees is not by increasing the number of votes needed for implementing one of the options. Furthermore, in our analysis we look at what is the probability of implementing the best option as a function of the number of followers. Finally, we consider two extensions to our main model: one where the leader has a biased towards either of the two options and, thus, may take advantage of his influence on the followers, and another extension where there are two leaders.
Our contribution to the literature lies in the inclusion of leadership in deliberative voting committees. To our knowledge, ours is the first attempt at modelling this phenomenon that is much present in real life situations. Nevertheless, the papers of Coughlan (2000) and AustenSmith and Feddersen (2006) are closely related to our work and modelling approach. These authors extend the strategic analysis of Condorcet (1785) Jury's framework by introducing a preliminary stage where voters can share information previous to voting. Information transmitted in the deliberation stage is not verifiable and thus, the deliberation stage is regarded as a cheap-talk game. Coughlan (2000) analyzes communication prior to a voting stage in a framework similar to ours and proves that sincere revelation of signals is obtained when voters are similar enough, independently of the rule used at the voting stage. Austen- Smith and Feddersen (2006) studies the circunstances under which unanimity rule can support truthful information revelation when voters are uncertain about the possible preference biases of other voters. We build on the model by Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) by assuming that voters' preferences depend directly on the profile of signals received by the voters, but we consider the possibility that some voters (the followers) do not use all the information available to decide their vote.
Also related to our paper are the works of Gerardi and Yariv (2007) , Jackson and Tan (2013) and Dewan and Myatt (2007 , 2008 , 2012 . Gerardi and Yariv (2007) show the equivalence of the set of equilibria for different voting rules under cheap talk when voters may use dominated strategies in the voting stage. Jackson and Tan (2013) model deliberation as the transmission of verifiable information prior to voting. In their model, a group of experts may receive privates signal or not and can choose whether to reveal the information they recive. Depending on the voting rule, experts may have incentives to hide their signals when the signal they receive goes against their ex-ante preferences. Finally, Dewan and Myatt (2007 , 2008 , 2012 study the role of leaders as a facilitators of coordination among the party activists in the process of choosing the best political platform. Party activist receive private information and wish to choose the best platform, but a sense a party unity introduces a coordination motive in their actions. By publicly communicating their information, leaders bridge differences of opinion among activist and become coordinating focal points. The focus of these papers relies on the impact of leaders' information precision and communication skills and how the costs of coordination may bias the party decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and the notation. In Section 3 present our main results and a welfare analysis. In Section 4 we extend the analysis by contemplating a situation where the leaders has a biased toward either option and another extensions where there are two leaders. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
The Model
Consider a committee formed by N + 1 voters where N ≥ 2 is an even number. Voters have to decide whether to implement an alternative A or to keep the status quo Q.
There are two states of nature, S = {A, Q}, and each voter receives a private signal about the state. The private signal received by voter i is given by θ i ∈ {A, Q} where Voters' preferences over the option implemented are not homogeneous. In particular, voters can be of three types: voter i is either a leader, i ∈ L, she is a follower, i ∈ F , or she is an objective voter i ∈ O. Initially, we assume that the set L is a singleton so there is a unique leader l, L = {l}. The preferences of each voter can be represented by a utility function u : {L, F, O} × {A, Q} × {A, Q} N +1 × {A, Q} N +1 → {A, Q} where the first argument is the type of the voter, the second argument is the option implemented, the third argument is the profile of signals and the fourth argument is the profile of messages. We assume voters are expected utility maximizers.
The leader is characterized by the fact that his message at the discussion stage has a great influence in some voters. Moreover, the leader may have a biased against either option in that she prefers the alternative A if and only if there is, in her opinion, sufficient evidence in favour of A. We model this as the leader requiring at least b ∈ {0, . . . , N + 1} signals in favour of A in order to prefer the alternative A during the voting stage. Given that p ≥ 1 2 , we say that the leader is unbiased if b = N 2 + 1 as in this case he prefers the option that is more likely to match with the state of nature given the signals received by all players. We say that the leaser is biased if b ̸ = N 2 + 1. 1 We represent the preferences of the leader by the following utility function:
The preferences of the followers depend completely on the message revealed by the leader.
Followers simply want the option revealed by the leader to win the election. Their preferences can be represented by the following utility function:
Even though followers may be thought of as behavioural agents in that their target is not to choose the option that matches with the state of nature, they are fully rational agents given their utility function. Furthermore, note that the followers' aim is to have the option revealed by the leader to win the election; they are not interested in the option the leader 
1 Although we are assuming ad-hoc that the leader can be biased, there are different arguments that justify the existence of such bias from the optimality (and Bayesian) point of view. For instance, Coughlan (2000) considers a framework where the voters want to make the "right" choice but the cost of not implementing the right choice is different depending on the state of nature. Alternatively, in Jackson and Tan (2013) It is assumed that all that is relevant to the game presented is common knowledge except for the realized value of the private signals: every voter only observes its own signal. Thus, players know the identity of the leader and how many followers there are in the committee.
Similarly, players also know the value of p, the accuracy of the signal, and b, the bias of the leader. Once voters receive their signals and before they reveal their messages they update their beliefs on the signals received by other voters using Bayesian updating.
We are interested in studying the circumstances under which there is full information transmission. We say that voter i in group G ∈ {L, F, O} truthfully reveals her signal if
Given the utility function of each voter, if all voters truthfully reveal their signals then the unique weakly dominant voting strategies for any voter i are given by: 
where E denotes the expected value operator.
Now we are in condition to introduce the equilibrium concept we are interested in: Given that when all voters truthfully report their signals there is a unique optimal voting strategy, when looking for FRE it is sufficient to look at individual incentives to report truthfully during the discussion stage assuming all other voters report truthfully. Therefore, when checking whether reporting truthfully is a best response strategy for a voter if all other voters are truthful at the discussion stage, we only need to consider the situations where her report may influence the final outcome of the election. We refer to such situations by saying that the voter is pivotal.
Definition 3. Given the truthful profile of messages θ, voter i is pivotal if there is a m
There are convenient implications of the assumption of the use of undominated strategies in the voting stage. When voters use undominated voting strategies, each voter's vote does not depend on the message she reports. Moreover, since by reporting a certain option a pivotal voter can only increase the support for such option if a voter is pivotal then the voting outcome coincides with the message this voter reveals.
Unbiased Leader

Fully Revealing Equilibrium
We analyze first the voters' strategic incentives in the discussion stage when the leader is When there are sufficiently many followers (#F ≥ q), then followers are enough as to force the implementation of any of the two options. In this case, the leader is pivotal always, and the only pivotal voter, as whatever option she reveals gets voted for by all followers and, hence, such option wins the election. As a consequence, the leader's vote always completely determines the option to be implemented. Therefore, the leader learns nothing from being pivotal and, thus, the only information she has about the signals of other voters is her own signal. In consequence, since the leader is unbiased and the accuracy of the signal is at least 1 2 , if she receives a certain signal she believes this signal is the one that most other voters receive. Thus, she has incentives to truthfully reveal her signal. Finally, when the number of followers is not enough as too completely determine the outcome of the voting stage (#F < q) but their number is enough to block the implementation of A in case all non-followers vote for the alternative (#F ≥ N + 1 − (q − 1)) a FRE is not possible. In this situation, whenever a follower is pivotal it is the case that the leader reports A as otherwise she reports Q and all followers vote for Q, blocking the implementation of the alternative. Thus, for a follower to be pivotal implies that the leader reports A, hence, such follower has incentives to report A regardless on her signal, i.e. she has incentives to lie.
As it can be observed from Proposition 1, there is a non-monotonic relation between the number of followers and whether or not there exists an equilibrium where all voters are truthful (FRE). Since the influence of the leader manifests itself via the followers, we have that effectively the number of followers is a measure on how influential the leader is. Thus, we can conclude from Proposition 1 that there is a non-monotonic relation between how influential the leader is and how truthful voters are at the discussion stage. As we shall see later on when the welfare analysis is presented, this non-monotonicity is also present when we calculate the probability of implementing the option that coincides with the state of nature 
Partially Revealing Equilibrium
Proposition 1 shows that there are some circumstance where a FRE is not possible. Next we turn our attention to study situations where, although no equilibrium where all voters tell the truth exists, equilibria where most voters tell the truth are possible. In particular, whenever a FRE does not exists because a type of voter has incentives to miss-report their signal, we construct a sequential Bayesian equilibrium where a subset of voters truthfully report their signals and each voter's decision in the voting stage is based on the information reported by these truthful subset of voters. 2
Definition 4. We say that voter
i is uninformative if σ m i (θ i ) is independent on θ i . Let K be
the set of uninformative voters and let K A be the set of uninformative voters who receive signal A.
We analyze first the optimal voting strategies for each type of voter under the existence of a a group of voters whose messages are not informative. For this section we assume that 2 So far we have analyzed the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibria with the implicit assumption that, under the prior probability beliefs for each pair of voters i, j with i ̸ = j, P (θi = mi | mi, θj) = 1. Now instead we focus on the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibria under the assumption that there is a group of voters whose report is not informative, while the remaining voters truthfully report the signal they have received. 
where 1 
where m is the message profile such that A PRE is a perfect (sequential) Bayesian equilibrium under the prior belief that the messages reported by uninformative voters do not provide relevant information, and the remaining voters truthfully report their signal. Notice that the voting strategies in (4), (5) and (6) are equivalent to those in (7), (8) and (9) In our next result we investigate the existence of a PRE in situations where a FRE is not possible. Thus, we restrict our attention to situations where q > #F > N + 1 − (q − 1).
Moreover, if a PRE exists then we focus on equilibria where the set of uninformative voters is minimal.
Since followers' only concern is the message reported by the leader and, given that q > #F > N + 1 − (q − 1), they can always force the voting outcome to be Q, followers are the most obvious candidates to be uninformative voters. We show that a PRE where objective voters are not uninformative can always be constructed. However, only if the accuracy of the signal, p, is low enough a PRE where the leader is also not uninformative exists.
Proposition 2. Assume that the leader is unbiased and q > F
then there exists a PRE with followers as the set of uninformative voters: K = F .
-If q = N + 1 and
then there exists a PRE with followers as the set of uninformative voters: K = F . 
-Otherwise, there is no PRE with with the followers as the set of uninformative voters, but there exists a PRE with followers and the leader as the set of uninformative voters:
That is, amongst those who tell the truth excluding the leader there are at least as many voters with A signals than with Q signals. This is true as otherwise objective voters and the leader vote for Q and the status quo is maintained regardless on the message revealed by the leader. However, if the accuracy of the signal, p, is high then #(
Thus, if the former happens then the leader has incentives to reveal A regardless on the signal she receives while if the latter occurs then the leader has incentives to report truthfully.
A consequence of Proposition 2 is that the voting rule q = N + 1 reduces the possible values of the signal p for which a PRE where the leader is truthful exists when compared to any other voting rule q ̸ = N + 1. Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that if q = N + 1 and #F is odd then there is no PRE with K = F . This is because if #F odd then since N + 1 is
If q ̸ = N + 1 then the condition for the existence of a P RE with K = F can be rewritten
In Figure 1 we plot the inequality above to illustrate the values of the accuracy of the signal p for which a PRE where the leader is truthful is possible.
Note that in general it is not true that more followers make the existence of a PRE where the leader is truthful less likely. For example, assume that N + 1 = 9 and q = 7 and consider two possibilities: #F = 4 and #F = 5. In this case, q > F ≥ N + 1 − (q − 1) and, thus, a FRE is not possible. Moreover, if #F = 4 then
= 2 and, thus, the condition for the existence of a PRE where the leader is truthful can be rewritten as
If, on the other hand, #F = 5 then
2 and, thus, the condition for the existence of a PRE where the leader is truthful can be rewritten as
It can be checked that, since #F = 4 implies #O = 4 and #F = 5 implies #O = 3, equation (10) is satisfied for a smaller set of parameter values for p than equation (11). Thus, in this case, an extra follower makes the existence of a PRE where the leader is truthful more likely.
Welfare Analysis
In this section we turn our attention to the welfare analysis. When talking about welfare, we assume that the objective of the committee is to choose the best option, meaning the option that coincides with the state of nature. In this sense, followers are seen as a distortion to the decision process of the committee and, thus, the question we raise here is: how does the existence of the followers affect the likelihood of implementing the best option?
Given the result in Corollary 2, if there were no followers then a FRE would always exists for all voting rules q. Moreover, if there were no followers then in a FRE the best option is implemented if and only if at least half the committee, N 2 +1, receives the signal that matches with the sate of nature. Thus, the probability of implementing the best option in this case is given by In order to get a better understanding of Proposition 3 we present Figure 2 , were we plot the probability of implementing the best option as a function on the number of followers for different voting rules q given the accuracy of the signal p. In Figure 2 the committee has a size of 9 voters. We have chosen a low value for the accuracy of the signal, p = 0.53, so that a PRE where the leader is truthful exists in this case (see Proposition 2). Second, again we observe a non-monotonicity in the effects of the number of followers: it is not true that for a given voting rule q more followers decrease the probability of implementing the right option. In Figure 2 this can be seen in the case where q = 6 (half plus one votes are needed to implement the alternative). In this situation, the probability of implementing the right option when there are 4 followers is smaller than where there are 5 of them. The reasons for this non-monotonicity are similar to those why it is not true that more followers make the existence of a PRE where the leader is truthful less likely.
Third, the majority rule is the one that maximizes the probability of implementing the right option for any number of followers. This is due to the fact that under the majority rule, there always exists a FRE for any number of followers, which is the equilibrium where the probability of choosing the best option is maximized.
Extensions
Biased Leader
Consider now the situation where the leader is biased, i.e. b ̸ = A consequence of Proposition 4 is that, once again, the majority rule is the voting rule that makes truthful sharing of information more likely, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the chances of implementing the best option are significantly reduced in the presence of a biased leader: either the leader is not truthful and all followers' vote is unrelated with what is the best option, or the leader is truthful (#F ≥ q) but her opinion is the only one that matters.
In Figure 3 we explore a situation where N + 1 = 9 and F ≥ q and show the values of p for which a FRE is possible given different bias levels. The higher the bias of the leader the more accurate is the precision of the signal needed for a FRE to exist. Proposition 4 deals with the case where the leader is the only voter who is biased. Although a FRE does not exits in the situations when objective voters suffice to determine the voting outcome, if objective voters had the same bias as the leader then a FRE exists. In this case, whenever the leader (or any objective voter) is pivotal her report determines the votes of all the voters that share her same preferences. Thus, whether the leader prefers A or Q depends on the signal she receives and consequently she has incentives to reveal truthfully. 4 Conversely, if the leader is unbiased and objective voters are biased (all with the same bias) then the converse arguments shows that a FRE is not possible. Finally, it is clear that if the leader is biased and #F < N + 1 − q (#O ≥ q) then a PRE exist where F ∪ {l} is the set of uninformative voters.
Multiple Leaders
In this section we extend our results to situations where the set of leaders contains two voters L = {l, l ′ }. While the preferences and voting behavior of leaders and objective voters are not affected by the existence of more than one leader, followers' behavior is affected. We assume that followers act as a type of objective voters that only care about the signals both leaders send: followers strictly prefer a certain option if and only if both leaders send the same signal and are indifferent between the two options if and only if the leaders send different signals.
Formally, the utility function that represents the preferences of the followers in the scenario with two leaders l and l ′ is given by
A weakly dominant voting strategy for the followers when all other voters are truthful is given by
In order to reduce the number of cases that need to be considered we assume that in case followers are indifferent between the alternative A and the status quo Q then they vote for the status quo.
Proposition 5.
Let L = {l, l ′ } and assume that both leaders are unbiased.
-If either #F ≥ q or #F < (N + 1) − (q − 1) then there is a FRE.
-If q > #F ≥ (N + 1) − (q − 1) then there is no FRE.
Comparing the results in Propositions 1 and 5 we can see that the existence of a second leader does not change the incentives to reveal information truthfully during the discussion We can conclude from Propositions 5 and 6 that our model is robust to the addition of an extra leader.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed information aggregation in deliberative committees under the presence of leadership. Deliberation is modeled as a cheap talk game where voters share non verifiable information about what is the best choice. We have shown that the presence of a leader and voters who follow the information revealed by the leader (followers) may introduce distortions in the decision process. Specifically, followers may have incentives to misreport their private information to obtain additional support for the option that matches with the leader's revealed information. Conversely, the leader may have incentives to compensate the followers' effect whenever her private information does not coincide with the best choice. This issues are more prevalent when the leader may have an "a priori" bias for one of the options. Surprisingly, the problem is alleviated if there are many followers; the leader knows that her report determines the final outcome, thus, if the quality of private information is sufficient then it is more likely that she supports the best choice (even if her preferences were ex-ante biased). Similar results and intuitions apply to the case in which the leadership in the committee is shared between two voters.
We want to conclude highlighting some possible extensions and directions of further research. The key concept of this paper is that the discussion stage defines the preferences of the members of the committee about the final outcome. We have chosen the most simple framework and modeled deliberation as cheap talk revelation games. There is a growing literature on debate, strategic argumentation and persuasion that could inspire new lines of research incorporating additional realism in the definition of the preferences of the members of the committee. 5 In this paper, we have also made abstraction of reputation issues and the dynamic component of the leadership. Since we have dealt with static elections where only two options are available, our focus on pure strategies and FRE and PRE becomes natural. In a dynamic setting, reputation effects could compensate the direct incentives of biased leaders to support the option towards which they have a biased, such analysis would need to consider more elaborated (mixed) strategies and beliefs. 
. 6 This can be rewritten as
which holds if and only if
The inequality above can be rewritten as
Comparing term by term the components of both sums at either side of the inequality above leads to the conclusion that the inequality holds if and only if #K + x > N + 1 − x. . The proof for the case where i ∈ K follows easily from the arguments above and, hence, its omitted.
6 Recall that we assume that if the number of truthful signals supporting each option is the same then the status quo is preferred.
Followers Since the followers always prefer the alternative that matches the report of the leader, they always vote according to the leader's report.
Objective Voters
The result follows directly from the arguments in the analysis of the leader's optimal voting strategy.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that the leader is unbiased and q > F ≥ N + 1 − (q − 1).
Assume there is a group of uninformative voters K. Note that if voter j belongs to K the she is not pivotal as in a PRE uninformative voter's messages are ignored. We proceed by studying the individual incentives of at the discussion stage of each of the different types of voters to check whether their messages can be informative.
, there are three possible scenarios where the leader is pivotal:
In this case if the leader reveals A then all voters choose
A and the alternative is implemented. On the other hand, if the leader reveals Q then followers choose Q and since #F ≥ (N + 1) − (q − 1) implies #O + 1 ≤ q − 1 we have that the status quo is maintained. Hence, the leader is pivotal. 
In this scenario the leader and objective voters vote for Q and, thus, the voting outcome is Q. Therefore, the leader is not pivotal.
Assume that q ̸ = N + 1. The leader is pivotal if and only if #( 
, then the leader prefers the voting outcome to coincide with the signal she has received and, therefore, reports truthfully.
Therefore, if
the leader reports A independently of the signal she has received. Otherwise, the leader's best response is to report truthfully, m l = θ l .
Consider now the case where q = N + 1. If θ l = A then the leader is pivotal if and only if
the leader has incentives to report truthfully.
Finally, if q = N + 1 and θ l = Q then the leader is pivotal if and only if #(
is true that #(Θ A K) = #(Θ Q K) then the leader has incentives to report Q, thus, she has incentives to report truthfully. If, on the other hand, #(Θ A K) > #(Θ Q K) then the leader has incentives to report A even though she received signal Q, i.e. she has incentives to miss-report. Hence, if
the leader reports A independently of the signal she has received. Otherwise, the leader's best response is to report truthfully.
Followers Consider an arbitrary follower f . Given the voting strategies in (7), (8) and (9) if q > #F ≥ (N + 1) − (q − 1) then the alternative A is implemented if and only if all followers (including f ) vote for A, which can happen only if m l = A. Thus, a necessary condition for a follower to be pivotal is that m l = A. Hence, such follower has incentives to report A regardless of her signal.
Objective Voters Consider an arbitrary objective voter o and let K ′′ = K \ {o}. A necessary condition for objective voter o to be pivotal is that #(
as otherwise her message does not influence any vote. Thus, o prefers the voting outcome to coincide with the signal she has received and she sends the
To conclude the proof, note that the followers are always uninformative: F ⊆ K. Moreover, as we have just shown for objective voters it is always a best response to truthfully report their signal whilst the leader is truthful if and only if q ̸ = N + 1 and
or q = N + 1 and
Proof of Proposition 3. If #F ≥ q then in a FRE the option implemented coincides with the message revealed by the leader. Thus, the probability that the option implemented matches with the state of nature given that the leader is truthful equals the probability that the signal of the leader coincides with the state of nature, i.e. p.
Assume that q > #F ≥ N + 1 − (q − 1) and the conditions in Proposition 2 for the leader not to be uninformative are satisfied. Since q > #F ≥ N + 1 − (q − 1) implies #O < q − 1 then the option implemented is A only if the leader's message is A and either the leader or one objective voter votes for A. Given that the leader and all the objective voters vote for the same option then the alternative A is implemented if and only if all voters vote for it.
Thus, in a PRE where the leader truthfully reveals her signal A is implemented if and only if
(see equation (9)). Thus, as both states are equally likely the probability of implementing the option that matches with the state of nature is given by a function w(N, #F, p) where
which can be rewritten as
If #F < (N + 1) − (q − 1) then #O ≥ q − 1 and since the leader is unbiased in a FRE the option implemented coincides with the option objective voters and the leader vote for. The option objective voters and the leader vote for is A if and only if #Θ A ≥ N 2 + 1. Thus, the probability of implementing the option that matches with the state of nature is given by 
Proof of Proposition
On the other hand, if b < N 2 + 1 and θ l = Q then the leader wants to truthfully reveal his signal if
In conclusion, if #F ≥ q then the leader follows a truth-telling best response if and only if p is high enough relative to b. Moreover, since followers and objective voters are never pivotal, truth-telling is always a best response for them. Thus, if #F ≥ q then there exists a FRE if and only if p is high enough relative to b.
Assume now that #F < q. We show that in this situation for at least one type of voter it is not a best-response strategy to report their true signal. If #F ≥ q and l is pivotal then l learns that
Therefore, l's best response is to report truthfully. Moreover, if θ l = Q, then since
l is indifferent between reporting A and reporting Q. In particular, reporting m l = Q is a best response. Therefore, if #F ≥ q then truth-telling is a best response for l. 
and l is not pivotal. Assume thus that #(Θ A l) = #(Θ Q l). There are two cases to be considered: To conclude the proof, assume that q > #F ≥ (N + 1) − (q − 1), which in turn implies #O ≤ q −3. In this case followers suffice to block the implementation of alternative A. For an arbitrary follower f to be pivotal it is necessary that
In this case, f prefers A to Q independently of the signal she receives and, hence, she has incentives to miss-report.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume first that #F ≥ q. In this case followers and objective voters are never pivotal, thus, for each i ∈ {F, O} we have that m i = θ i is a best response and both followers and objective voters report truthfully.
Consider leader l and assume that b ≥ N 2 + 1. In this case leader l is pivotal only if θ l ′ = A. Thus, if θ l = A then since l has no information about the signals of neither followers nor objective voters she prefers A to Q if and only if
Note that the inequality above holds is true for p = 1 and since
is an increasing polynomial in p, for each b there is an interior value of p such that the inequality is satisfied: l prefers A to Q and m l = A is a best response for l. On the other hand, Consider now that b < N 2 + 1. By similar arguments as the ones used above, whenever l is pivotal it is necessarily the case that θ l ′ = A. Thus, if θ l = A, then
Therefore, l prefers A to Q and truth-telling is a best response. On the other hand, if
to Q and m l = A is the best response for l. Thus, l has incentives to miss-report and a FRE does not exist.
Assume now that #F < q, we need to show that there is always a voter whose best response whenever all other voters truthfully report their signals is to miss-report. We proceed 
